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Abstract—In this letter, we consider the physical-layer security
(PLS) in full-duplex (FD) multiuser multiple-input-multiple-
output (MIMO) short-packet communications, where a base
station (BS) transmits precoded signals for secure downlink
multicast while receiving signals from uplink users. To quantify
the PLS performance in the worst-case scenario, we consider
the possible maximum wiretapping capability of a multi-antenna
eavesdropper. Taking into account the self-interference (SI) in
FD mode and the co-channel interference (CCI) from uplink
to downlink, we analyse the secrecy throughput in finite block-
length regime and obtain its analytic expression, which perfectly
matches asymptotic and simulation results in various scenarios.
Moreover, the investigations on secrecy throughput substantiate
that the FD multiuser MIMO systems outperform their half-
duplex counterparts given the SI being sufficiently suppressed
and the CCI being well managed.
Index Terms—Finite blocklength, full duplex (FD), multiuser
multiple-input-multiple-output (MU-MIMO), physical-layer se-
curity (PLS), short-packet communications.
I. INTRODUCTION
In wireless communications, multiuser multiple-input-
multiple-output (MU-MIMO) systems have been widely ap-
plied for simultaneous delivery of distinct signals from/to a
group of peer users, for meeting the requirements on latency
and capacity [1]. The design of current MU-MIMO systems
mainly focuses on how to efficiently transmit long pack-
ets, based on the classical analysis framework of Shannon’s
convergence of optimal coding rate to channel capacity [2].
Recent information-theoretic advances in finite blocklength
regime have established a basis for the design of short-packet
protocols to achieve ultra-reliable low-latency communications
(URLLCs) [3]. Compared with their long-packet counterparts,
MU-MIMO short-packet communications bring about new
communication models, and associated theoretical principles
need to be addressed to assess their performance.
In addition to URLLC features, the physical-layer secu-
rity (PLS) in MU-MIMO short-packet communications has
attracted research interests of academics and practitioners.
Specifically, half-duplex (HD) mode has been investigated
in finite blocklength regime for secure MU-MIMO systems.
In [4], the optimization of weighted throughput, subject to
the constraints on total transmit power and bandwidth, was
investigated for a secure URLLC system. In [5], a transmit
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power minimization problem was formulated in finite block-
length regime for a downlink MU-MIMO system. Besides, the
PLS performance of a single-user downlink in mission-critical
applications was studied in [6], where the optimal blocklength
was derived and the impact of artificial noise was analysed.
To the best of our knowledge, the full-duplex (FD) mode
has not yet been addressed in MU-MIMO short-packet com-
munications. In finite blocklength regime, the main difference
between FD and HD modes lies in the blocklength assignment.
In FD mode, uplink and downlink multiplex the same block-
length. In HD mode, the accessible blocklength is divided into
two orthogonal parts assigned to uplink and downlink. That is,
the number of channel uses admitted in FD mode is twice that
in HD mode. As is known, more available channel uses always
help with the decrease in decoding error probability, which
leads to a higher reliability. Motivated by this, we develop an
FD transmission strategy to enhance the PLS for MU-MIMO
short-packet communications.
Our main contributions in this work are three-fold. (i) the
secrecy throughput of FD MU-MIMO systems is analysed
in finite blocklength regime and obtained in an analytic
form. (ii) Asymptotic expressions are established to obtain
closed-form approximations for extreme values of blocklength,
transmit power and antenna number. (iii) The impacts of self-
interference (SI), co-channel interference (CCI) and imperfect
channel state information (CSI) are taken into account.
Notations: 𝑓𝑋 (𝑥) and 𝐹𝑋 (𝑥) stand for the probability
density function (pdf) and the cumulative distribution function
(cdf) of a random variable 𝑋 , respectively. Moreover, E𝑋 (·)
denotes the expectation with respect to 𝑋 . The conjugate









𝑥−1𝑒−𝑡d𝑡 and Γ(𝛼, 𝑥) =∫ ∞
𝑥
𝑡𝛼−1𝑒−𝑡d𝑡 are the Q-function, the gamma function and the
upper incomplete gamma function, respectively.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a secure FD MU-MIMO system shown in Fig. 1,
where the FD base station (BS), having 𝑁T transmit antennas
(TAs) and 𝑁R receive antennas (RAs), simultaneously serves
𝐾D downlink and 𝐾U uplink single-antenna HD legitimate
users, in the presence of an 𝑁E-antenna passive eavesdropper
(Eve). Without loss of generality, we have 𝑁T > 𝐾D and
𝑁R > 𝐾U. To maximize Eve’s wiretapping capability in the
interest of quantifying the maximum possible information
leakage, she utilizes 𝑁E > 𝐾U+𝐾D antennas to perfectly detect
the signals transmitted from uplink users and the BS.
The uplink channel matrix is denoted by HU ∈ C𝑁R×𝐾U ,
where the 𝑖th column hU
𝑖






































Fig. 1. Channel model of a full-duplex MU-MIMO wiretap system.
channel coefficients spanning from Uplink User 𝑖 to the
BS, 𝑖 ∈ K𝑈 = {1, 2, · · · , 𝐾U}. The elements in hU𝑖 are
identical and independently distributed (i.i.d.) complex Gaus-





∼ CN(0𝑁R×1,ΦU𝑖 I𝑁R ). The wiretapping channel in the
uplink is denoted by GU ∈ C𝑁E×𝐾U , where the 𝑖th column
gU
𝑖
∼ CN(0𝑁E×1,ΨU𝑖 I𝑁E ) is the wiretapping channel spanning
from Uplink User 𝑖 to Eve, 𝑖 ∈ K𝑈 . In the downlink, the
legitimate channel spanning from the BS to User 𝑗 is denoted
by an 𝑁T × 1 vector hD𝑗 ∼ CN(01×𝑁T ,ΦD𝑗 I𝑁T ), 𝑗 ∈ K𝐷 =
{1, 2, · · · , 𝐾D}. The wiretapping channel spanning from the
BS to Eve is denoted by an 𝑁E × 𝑁T matrix GD = [𝑔D𝑚𝑛]𝑁E×𝑁T ,
where the (𝑚, 𝑛)th entry 𝑔D𝑚𝑛 ∼ CN(0,ΨD).
The residual SI at BS can be modelled as a random
variable following CN(0, 𝜛𝑃B) [7], where 𝜛 denotes the
BS’s capability of SI cancellation and 𝑃B is the BS’s total
transmit power. Given the BS’s SI channel HSI ∈ C𝑁R×𝑁T , its
received signals rB ∈ C𝑁R×1 are characterised as
rB = HUxU + HSIWxD + zB, (1)
where W ∈ C𝑁T×𝐾D is the BS’s precoding matrix, and its 𝑗 th
column w 𝑗 ∈ C𝑁T×1 is a linear combination of orthonormal
bases in the null space of interference channels to Downlink
User 𝑗 . The 𝐾U × 1 vector xU = [𝑥U1 , 𝑥
U




the signals transmitted from uplink users. The 𝐾D × 1 vector
xD = [𝑥D1 , 𝑥
D
2 , · · · , 𝑥
D
𝐾D
]𝑇 contains the signals transmitted to
downlink users. The 𝑁𝑅 × 1 vector zB ∼ CN(0𝑁R×1, 𝜎2BI𝑁𝑅 )
contains the BS’s received additive white Gaussian noise
(AWGN) components.
The CCI channel matrix is denoted by HCCI ∈ C𝐾U×𝐾D ,
where the 𝑗 th column hCCI
𝑗
∼ CN(0𝐾U×1,ΦCCI𝑗 I𝐾U ) contains
the CCI channels from all 𝐾U uplink users to Downlink User
𝑗 . Thus, the signal received at Downlink User 𝑗 is [8]





) is the AWGN at Downlink User 𝑗 .
In practice, the BS utilizes zero-forcing (ZF) principles
for both uplink detection and downlink transmission based
on the estimated CSI ĤU = HU + Y𝚫U and ĥD𝑗 = hD𝑗 +
Y𝚫D, where Y is the error measure. The entries of 𝚫U ∈
C𝑁R×𝐾U and 𝚫D ∈ C𝑁T×1 are i.i.d. and follow CN(0, 1)
[9]. As such, the BS’s received signal-to-interference-plus-
noise ratio (SINR) for Uplink User 𝑖, denoted by 𝛾U
𝑖
, is
approximated as a Gamma-distributed random variable with














mit power of Uplink User 𝑖. Similarly, Downlink User 𝑗’s
received SINR 𝛾D
𝑗







/(∑𝑖∈KU 𝑃U𝑖 ΦCCI𝑗 + Y2 ∑𝑘∈KD 𝑃D𝑘 + 𝜎2𝑗 ), where 𝑃D𝑗








Eve’s received signals are contained by the 𝑁E × 1 vector:
rE = GUxU + GDWxD + zE, (3)
where zE ∼ CN(0𝑁E×1, 𝜎2EI𝑁E ) contains Eve’s AWGN com-





























































, respectively. If Eve obtains the
BS’s estimation ĥD
𝑗
by wiretapping the feedback channel in
downlink [11], she will be able to calculate W. Further, to
theoretically quantify the secrecy throughput in the absolute
worst-case scenario where Eve has the possible maximum
wiretapping capability [12], Eve’s SINR is upper bounded
by her signal-to-noise power ratio (SNR) in a perfect ZF
detection [13]. In this case, based on the invariant law of
Gaussian random vector under rotation [14], the upper bounds
on Eve’s wiretapping SINRs exhibit Gamma distribution,
























III. MULTIUSER MIMO SECRECY THROUGHPUT IN
FINITE BLOCKLENGTH REGIME
In this section, we analyse PLS performance of FD MU-
MIMO short-packet wiretap systems. Different from classical
analysis of infinite blocklength framework, decoding error
probability and information leakage need to be addressed
concerning the finite number of channel uses. Given the
blocklength 𝑁 , the error probability 𝜖 and the information
leakage 𝛿, the maximal instantaneous secrecy rate of a wiretap







𝑉E/𝑁𝑄−1 (𝛿), 𝛾 > 𝛾E,
0, 𝛾 < 𝛾E,
(6)
where 𝐶𝑆 = log2 (1 + 𝛾) − log2 (1 + 𝛾𝐸 ) is the secrecy capacity
of the wiretap system for the infinite number of channel uses,
with 𝛾 and 𝛾E denoting the legitimate and wiretapping SINRs,
respectively. Moreover, 𝑉 =
(






1 − 1/(1 + 𝛾2E)
)
(log 𝑒)2 denote the channel dispersions
of legitimate link and wiretapping link, respectively.
In quasi-static fading channels, for a given transmission of 𝐵
information bits over the blocklength 𝑁 , the error probability
can be obtained by
















conditioned on 𝛾 > 𝛾E. Note that, 𝜖 = 1 if 𝛾 < 𝛾E.
Leveraging the error probability, the secrecy throughput in
finite blocklength regime is defined as [6]
𝑇 , (𝐵/𝑁)
(
1 − E𝛾,𝛾E (𝜖)
)
. (8)
With this definition, the secrecy throughput of a user’s infor-
mation delivery in the FD MU-MIMO short-packet wiretap
system under study is derived in the following theorem.
Theorem: For the delivery of 𝐵𝑘 information bits over the
blocklength 𝑁𝑘 from/to a user 𝑘 , 𝑘 ∈ K𝑈 ∪ K𝐷 , the secrecy





























) ([𝑘 − [𝑘/𝜔𝑘 )𝑀𝑘−𝑚
([𝑘 𝜌𝐸,𝑘 )𝑛−1
Γ(𝑚 + 𝑛 − 1)
Γ(𝑛) (10)









. For uplink users,
i.e., 𝑘 ∈ K𝑈 , the spatial degree of freedom (DoF) 𝑀𝑘 = 𝑁R −
𝐾U + 1, and the rate parameters 𝜌𝑘 = 𝜌U𝑘 , 𝜌E,𝑘 = 𝜌
U
E,𝑘 . For
downlink users, i.e., 𝑘 ∈ K𝐷 , the spatial DoF 𝑀𝑘 = 𝑁T−𝐾D+1




, 𝜌E,𝑘 = 𝜌DE,𝑘 .
Proof: Due to the Q-function, it is hard to get a closed-
form expression of the secrecy throughput. Using a linear
approximation of Q-function, we approximate the error prob-
ability 𝜖 as [16]
𝜖 (𝛾, 𝛾E) ≈

0, 𝛾 > b,
1/2 − a
√
𝑁 (𝛾 − \) , Z 6 𝛾 < b,
1, 𝛾 < Z,
(11)
where \ = 2
√
𝑉E/𝑁𝑄−1 (𝛿)+𝐵/𝑁 (1+𝛾E) −1, a = 1/
√︁
2𝜋\ (\ + 2),
Z = \ − 1/(2a
√
𝑁), and b = \ + 1/(2a
√
𝑁).










1 − 𝜖 (𝛾, 𝛾E)
)












where (𝑎) is obtained by substituting (11) into (8) and lever-
aging the Riemann integral approximation.
Moreover, with the increase in 𝛾E, Eve’s channel dispersion
𝑉𝐸 can be approximated to 1 without losing calculation accu-
racy [17]. For a specific user 𝑘 , we have \𝑘 (𝛾E,𝑘 ) ≈ 𝜔𝑘 (1 +




Based on these approximations and the cdf of 𝛾E,𝑘 , the
secrecy throughput of the information delivery pertaining to




























































Finally, leveraging binomial expansion and the integral
formula [18, (3.351-3)], the expression of Ω𝑘 in (10) and the
approximation of secrecy throughput in (9) are attained.
Corollary 1: In the case of infinite blocklength, i.e., 𝑁𝑘 goes










Γ(𝑀𝑘 + 𝑛 − 1)





where 𝛼𝑘 denotes the coding rate of User 𝑘 .
Proof: The asymptotic result in (15) is obtained by
substituting lim
𝑁𝑘→∞








Corollary 2: As the transmit power pertaining to the signals
of User 𝑘 increases, the secrecy throughput of User 𝑘 , in the















Γ(𝑀𝑘 + 𝑛 − 1)





However, if the BS’s channel estimation is imperfect while
Eve has a perfect detection, the secrecy throughput of User 𝑘
is given by lim𝑃𝑘→∞ 𝑇𝑘 = 0.
Proof: If the BS knows perfect CSI, lim
𝑃𝑘→∞
[𝑘 = 0 holds.






Γ(𝑀𝑘 + 𝑛 − 1)
Γ(𝑛) ([𝑘 𝜌E,𝑘 )𝑛−1
. (17)





𝑀𝑘 , (𝜔𝑘 − 1)/𝜌𝑘
)
/Γ(𝑀𝑘 ) = 1. (18)
The limit of the secrecy throughput pertaining to User 𝑘 is
obtained by substituting (17) and (18) into (9).
If the BS’s channel estimation is imperfect, lim𝑃𝑘→∞ 𝜌𝑘 =
Φ𝑘/Y2 and lim𝑃𝑘→∞ 𝜌E,𝑘 = +∞, which nullifies the terms
with 𝑛 > 1 in (10). Using [18, (8.352-2)] again, we obtain
lim𝑃𝑘→∞ 𝑇𝑘 = 0.
4
Corollary 3: As the number of TAs or RAs increases, the
secrecy throughput of User 𝑘 is limited by
lim
𝑀𝑘→∞
𝑇𝑘 = 𝐵𝑘/𝑁𝑘 . (19)




([𝑘 − [𝑘/𝜔𝑘 )𝑀𝑘−𝑚
Γ(𝑀𝑘 − 𝑚 + 1)
𝑀E,𝑘∑︁
𝑛=1
Γ(𝑚 + 𝑛 − 1)Γ(𝑀𝑘 )




Γ(𝑀𝑘 + 𝑛 − 1)/Γ(𝑀𝑘 )
≤ Γ(𝑀𝑘 )Γ(𝑀E,𝑘 ) (𝑀𝑘 )𝑀E,𝑘 𝑒[𝑘−[𝑘/𝜔𝑘 . (20)






([𝑘 𝜌𝑘 )𝑀𝑘Γ (𝑀𝑘 )
Ω𝑘 = 0. (21)





𝑀𝑘 , (𝜔𝑘 − 1)/𝜌𝑘
)




𝑖=0 [(𝜔𝑘 − 1)[𝑘/𝜔𝑘 ]
𝑖/𝑖! = 𝑒 (𝜔𝑘−1)[𝑘/𝜔𝑘 .
Then, (19) is attained by substituting (21) and (22) into (9).
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
Based on the aforementioned derivations and analysis, in
this section we investigate the sum secrecy throughput defined
as 𝑇 =
∑𝐾
𝑘=1 𝑇𝑘 , where 𝐾 ∈ {𝐾U, 𝐾D}, and 𝑇𝑘 is given in (9).
In the uplink, the average received SNR of User 𝑖’s signal at










0dB, respectively, 𝑖 ∈ K𝑈 . In the downlink, the BS allocates
the same transmit power to all users, and the total normalized
transmit power is set to 𝑃B/𝜎2𝑗 = 30dB. The total normalized
received power at User 𝑗 and Eve are set to 𝑃BΦD𝑗 /𝜎2𝑗 = 20dB
and 𝑃BΨD/𝜎2E = 10dB, respectively.
The BS’s SI cancellation capability is set to 𝜛 = −70 dB
[19], and the large scale fading of CCI is set to ΦCCI
𝑗
= −70
dB, 𝑗 ∈ K𝐷 [8]. The measure of BS’s channel estimation error
is Y = 5% [9]. Eve has 𝑁𝐸 = 8 antennas, and the information
leakage is 𝛿 = 10−3. Monte Carlo simulation results over 106
channel realizations are provided to confirm the validity of our
theoretical approximations and asymptotic results.
For the sake of comparison, the secrecy throughput of HD
mode is investigated as well, where the information amount
delivered for user 𝑘 is 𝐵𝑘 = 1000 bits. Given the same coding
rate, both the information amount and the blocklength of a
user in the FD system are twice those in the HD system.
To begin with, the impacts of the blocklength 𝑁𝑘 , the
normalized transmit power 𝜌B and 𝜌U, and the number of
antennas, 𝑁T = 𝑁R, on the sum secrecy throughput 𝑇 are
investigated in Figs. 2, 3 and 4, where 𝐾U = 𝐾D = 3.
As shown in these figures, the FD MU-MIMO system
achieves higher secrecy throughput than its HD counterpart
as long as the SI and CCI are well managed, in both cases
of perfect and imperfect CSI. The main reason behind this
is that uplink and downlink in the FD system multiplex the
same blocklength, whereas the HD system divides the entire












Fig. 2. Sum secrecy throughput ?̂? versus the blocklength 𝑁𝑘 . The number
of antennas at BS, 𝑁T = 𝑁R = 8.












Fig. 3. Sum secrecy throughput ?̂? versus transmit power. The blocklength
𝑁𝑘 = 250 channel uses in HD systems and 𝑁𝑘 = 500 channel uses in FD
systems. The number of antennas at BS, 𝑁T = 𝑁R = 8.
blocklength into two orthogonal parts to serve uplink and
downlink separately. From (7), we may find that a longer
blocklength leads to lower error probability, which eventually
contributes to a higher secrecy throughput.
Fig. 2 reveals that the secrecy throughput is improved
along with the increase of blocklength in the case of short
blocklength. However, as the blocklength further increases, the
secrecy throughput decreases. This phenomenon is about the
tradeoff between error probability and throughput, concerning
the throughput is lower if the fixed amount of information
bits is delivered through longer blocklength. Moreover, since
the secrecy throughput has been proved to be a quasi-concave
function of blocklength in HD single-user single-antenna
systems [6], an optimal blocklength can be obtained through
bisection search for finding the maximum secrecy throughput,
which achieves the tradeoff between latency and reliability. In
MU-MIMO systems, 𝑇𝑘 is still a quasi-concave function of
𝑁𝑘 for each user and, therefore, the optimal blocklength can
also be obtained by searching maximum 𝑇 . Additionally, in
the case of longer blocklength, the secrecy throughput agrees
5










Fig. 4. Sum secrecy throughput ?̂? versus the number of TAs or RAs, 𝑁T =
𝑁R. The blocklength 𝑁𝑘 = 250 channel uses in the HD system and 𝑁𝑘 = 500
channel uses in the FD system.











Fig. 5. Sum secrecy throughput ?̂? versus the number of users, 𝐾U = 𝐾D.
The blocklength 𝑁𝑘 = 250 channel uses in the HD system and 𝑁𝑘 = 500
channel uses in the FD system. The spatial DoF of User 𝑘 at Eve, 𝑀𝑘 = 3.
with the asymptotic result given in Corollary 1.
As shown in Figs. 3 and 4, with perfect CSI, the secrecy
throughput is improved as the transmit power or the number
of BS’s antennas increases. When the transmit power or the
number of antennas goes to infinity, the secrecy throughput
converges to the asymptotic results given in Corollary 2 and
Corollary 3, respectively. In the case of imperfect CSI, the
secrecy throughput increases first and then decreases with
the increase of transmit power. As the transmit power fur-
ther increases, the secrecy throughput goes to zero, because
legitimate SINR is limited by channel estimation error while
wiretapping SINR keeps increasing. On the other hand, in-
creasing the spatial DoF of legitimate links guarantees the
convergence of secrecy throughput to asymptotic results in
the case of imperfect CSI as well.
From Fig. 5, we observe that the sum secrecy throughput
increases along with the number of users in the case of a
few users. If the BS needs to serve many users, the sum
secrecy throughput will get lower because the transmit power
and spatial DoF pertaining to each user are reduced.
In addition, the comparisons in Figs. 2, 3, 4 and 5 substan-
tiate the validity of our theoretical derivations and asymptotic
results, as they match the simulation results very well.
V. CONCLUSION
This letter proposed a model of FD MU-MIMO short-packet
wiretap systems. The PLS transmission strategy was formu-
lated on the basis of ZF principles and the eavesdropper’s
wiretapping capability was maximised. To quantify the PLS
performance of the FD MU-MIMO system, we derived its
secrecy throughput in finite blocklength regime and obtained
the analytic expression. Illustrative numerical results provided
handy tools and useful references for the design of secure FD
MU-MIMO short-packet systems.
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